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Abstract 
The impacts of climate change threaten to cause the displacement of millions of people 
worldwide by the middle of this century. In spite of this looming crisis, international law 
provides insufficient protection to those who will be forced to migrate. In most cases, 
those who are displaced will fall outside of current protection frameworks. This paper 
examines why this protection deficit should be of particular concern to New Zealand, and 
it argues that there are significant incentives for New Zealand to develop a response to 
the issue of climate change displacement in the Pacific. The paper concludes that in 
order to ensure Pacific peoples are able to migrate with dignity, pre-emptive, voluntary 
migration schemes should be put in place to facilitate migration flows. These should 
build upon the current immigration framework, and include the extension of current 
permanent and temporary migration schemes, as well as the introduction of labour-
training migration schemes.  
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I Introduction 
In its first Assessment Report in 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) first warned that the “gravest effects of climate change may be those on human 
migration”.1 Successive reports have since then repeatedly confirmed that “the impacts of 
anthropogenic climate change are expected to lead to large-scale population 
displacements and migrations in the coming decades”.2 The world faces an impending 
displacement crisis. Increased frequency and severity of “climate events” such as storms, 
floods, and droughts, as well as environmental degradation as a result of slow-onset 
“climate processes” such as sea-level rise, salination of agricultural land and water 
sources, desertification, and growing water scarcity, will lead to the displacement of 
millions of people.3 Indeed this process has already begun. Climate related disasters are 
estimated to have been responsible for displacing approximately 20 million people in 
2008 – and as a figure excluding the impacts of climate processes, it can be considered a 
minimum estimate of total climate change displacement.4 Habitation in many parts of the 
world is becoming increasingly challenging. 
 
Attempts to quantify the expected number of people who will be displaced by climate 
change “are fraught with numerous methodological problems and caveats”.5 All estimates 
are based on unknown variables and assumptions regarding economic and social 
conditions, population growth, temperature increase, the rate at which climate change 
impacts will be felt, as well as the level of investment in mitigation and adaptation 
  
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Policymakers’ Summary of the Potential Impacts of Climate 
Change. Report from Working Group II to IPCC (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990) at 20. 
2 International Organization for Migration Climate Change, Migration and Critical International Security 
Considerations (2011) at 9. 
3 Jane McAdam “Environmental Migration Governance” (University of New South Wales Faculty of Law 
Research Series, 2009, No 1) at 9. 
4 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council Monitoring Disaster Displacement in the Context of Climate 
Change: Findings of a Study by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (September 2009) at 12.   
5 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System 
to Protect Climate Refugees” (2010) 10 Global Environmental Politics 60 at 67. 
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measures.6 The prediction most often repeated is that by 2050, between 200 and 250 
million people will be displaced by climate change7 – a ten-fold increase over current 
numbers of documented refugees and internally displaced people.8 Other estimates vary 
from between 25 million to 1 billion climate migrants by 2050.9 This leaves no doubt that 
while the numbers are uncertain, the phenomenon is not. The disruption to current 
patterns of human settlement and migration as a result of climate change will be 
widespread and severe. 
 
Despite this looming crisis, international law provides insufficient protection to those 
who are displaced by climate change. In most cases, those who are forced to relocate will 
not fall within current protection frameworks. This gap at international law should be of 
particular concern to New Zealand, which is likely to face increasing migration demands 
from neighbouring Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs) - states which are 
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and where levels of out-
migration are likely to be high. This creates a considerable incentive for New Zealand to 
begin to examine possible responses to this issue. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the case for New Zealand action on the issue of 
climate change displacement in the Pacific and to present possible policy responses. It 
argues that in order to ensure “migration with dignity”,10 a New Zealand response should 
focus on the implementation of pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes to increase 
mobility in the Pacific. This paper concludes that these schemes should build upon New 
Zealand’s existing immigration framework and include the expansion of permanent and 
temporary migration schemes, as well as the implementation of labour-training 
programmes aimed at Pacific peoples. 
 
  
6 Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas “Protecting Climate Refugees - The Case for a Global Protocol” 
Environment Magazine (Washington, Nov/Dec 2008) at 10; McAdam, above n 3, at 2. 
7  International Organization for Migration, above n 2, at 13. 
8  International Organization for Migration Migration and Climate Change (2008) at 11. 
9  International Organization for Migration, above n 2, at 9. 
10 “Relocation” Kiribati Climate Change <www.climate.gov.ki>. 
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The discussion will proceed first by outlining the current lack of protection at 
international law. Secondly it will examine why this lack of protection is of particular 
salience to New Zealand, and the case for New Zealand action on the issue. It then 
discusses the general shape which a New Zealand policy response should take. Finally, 
substantive policy recommendations are provided.  
 
II The International Legal Framework 
The international legal regime grants only marginal protection to those who are displaced 
by climate change. This protection deficit has been the subject of considerable attention 
in legal scholarship,11 reports by international organisations and non-governmental 
organisations,12 and international and regional fora,13 and it is now well-accepted that in 
most cases, those who are displaced by climate change will be unable to gain protection 
either under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee 195114 (“the Refugee 
Convention”) or complementary protection measures at international law. There is also 
no protection afforded under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change15 (UNFCCC) or at a regional level in the Pacific, and there is no established 
“responsibility to protect” in cases of environmental disaster.  
 
This position was confirmed in the New Zealand context in the recent Immigration and 
Protection Tribunal (IPT) decision in AF (Kiribati),16 endorsed on appeal by both the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal in Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of 
  
11 Authors include: Jane McAdam; Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas; Maxine Burkett; Benoit Mayer; David 
Hodgkinson, Tess Burton, Heather Anderson and Lucy Young; and Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini. 
12 Extensive work has been completed, for example by: International Organization for Migration; United 
Nations Refugee Agency; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World 
Bank; Asian Development Bank; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; and Friends of the Earth. 
13 For example: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change – Conference of the Parties; 
Pacific Islands Forum. 
14 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137 (opened for signature 28 July 1951, 
entered into force 22 April 1954). 
15 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 UNTS 107 (opened for signature 9 May 
1992, entered into force 21 March 1994). 
16 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413. 
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Business, Innovation and Employment.17 The applicant was a citizen of Kiribati seeking 
protection in New Zealand on the basis of rising sea levels and environmental 
degradation as a result of climate change in Kiribati.18 The IPT and the Courts accepted 
the evidence presented by the applicant of the impacts of climate change on Kiribati - 
storm surges, extreme high spring tides, flooding of residential areas, raised floors of 
residences, depletion of fishing stocks, diminution of arable land, contamination of 
drinking water by salt water, sewage contamination of water tables, and deterioration of 
the population’s health.19 Nevertheless, the application was rejected. It was found that the 
applicant could gain neither refugee status nor protected person status in New Zealand. 
A Refugee Status and Complementary Protection 
It is clear that in most cases, those who are displaced by climate change will not be able 
to seek protection under the refugee or complementary protection frameworks. 
1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 
A person is a refugee, for the purposes of the Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol,20 who:21 
 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country … 
 
There are a number of obstacles to people displaced by climate change gaining protection 
under the Refugee Convention. Firstly, there is significant difficulty in characterising 
  
17 Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 
3125; Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] 
NZCA 173. 
18 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [15]. 
19 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [18]. 
20 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267 (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 
4 October 1967).  
21 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, above n 14, art 1A(2). 
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climate change as “persecution”, which requires an element of human agency.22 
Secondly, even if it were accepted that climate change was a form of “persecution”, the 
indiscriminate nature of its impacts precludes this persecution occurring on the basis of 
one of the five Convention grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.23 Finally, many people displaced by climate 
change are also likely to still be within their home country when seeking protection.24 
Therefore, while those who are displaced by climate change are not expressly precluded 
from gaining refugee status, an applicant would need to prove that an additional element 
constituting persecution on one of the Convention grounds was present.25  
 
The decision in Teitiota confirmed this analysis. The Refugee Convention definition of a 
“refugee” is incorporated into domestic legislation under s 129(1) of the Immigration Act, 
which requires that “a person must be recognised as a refugee … if he or she is a refugee 
within the meaning of the Refugee Convention”.26 The IPT and Courts found that while 
the term “refugee” may be used in the political realm to refer to those displaced by 
natural disasters or climate change, “it is abundantly clear that displacement of such 
refugees has not been caused by persecution” and, therefore, does not fall within the 
definition provided by the Refugee Convention.27 It was noted that while “persecution” is 
not defined in the Convention, New Zealand has adopted a “human rights” approach, 
necessitating “the sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights demonstrative 
of a failure of state protection”.28 Human agency is, therefore, required. In addition, the 
Court found that it could not be said that people displaced by climate change “had 
become refugees on one of the five stipulated Convention grounds”.29 
  
22  Jane McAdam Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at 43; McAdam, above n 3, at 12; Robert McLeman “Climate Change Migration, Refugee 
Protection, and Adaptive Capacity-Building” (2008) 4 McGill International Journal of Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 1 at 14. 
23  McAdam, above n 22, at 44; McAdam, above n 3, at 48. 
24 McAdam, above n 22, at 43; McAdam, above n 3, at 13. 
25 McAdam, above n 22, at 44. 
26 Immigration Act 2009, s 129(1). 
27 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [11]. 
28 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [8]. 
29 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [11]. 
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The Court emphasised, however, that because there is “a complex inter-relationship 
between natural disasters, environmental degradation and human vulnerability”, this does 
not mean that environmental degradation can never provide pathways into the 
Convention.30 It may, for example, where environmental degradation leads to armed 
conflict or where humanitarian relief becomes politicised, and persecution on one of the 
five Convention grounds becomes present.31 Those displaced by reason of climate change 
alone, however, cannot obtain protection under the Refugee Convention.32 
2 Complementary Protection 
Complementary protection, which precludes the non-refoulement of people who would 
be at risk of persecution, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
and arbitrary threats to life, has also been raised as a possible ground of protection for 
those displaced by climate change.33 Again, there is no express preclusion stopping those 
who have been displaced by climate change from gaining protection under this ground. 
However, Courts have been careful to delimit these terms, and according to current 
jurisprudence the impacts of climate change alone cannot be considered “cruel or 
degrading treatment”.34 
 
Complementary protection is incorporated into New Zealand law under the Immigration 
Act as a form of protection supplementary to refugee status – “protected person status”.35 
Section 130 requires a person to be recognised as a protected person under the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
  
30 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [27]. 
31 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [27]. 
32 Teitiota NZHC, above n 17, at [26]. 
33  McAdam, above n 3, at 18. 
34 McAdam, above n 22, at 54; Jane McAdam and Ben Saul “Displacement with Dignity: International Law 
and Policy Responses to Climate Change Migration and Security in Bangladesh” (University of New South 
Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, 2010, No 63) at 24. 
35 Doug Tennent and Katy Armstrong Immigration and Refugee Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2013) at 21. 
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Punishment36 (“the Torture Convention”) where the applicant would be “in danger of 
being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand”.37 Section 131 requires that 
someone be recognised as a protected person under arts 6 and 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)38 where there are substantial grounds to 
believe they would be in danger of “being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or 
cruel treatment” if deported.39  
 
Section 130 is unlikely to provide a ground of protection for those displaced by climate 
change.40 The definition of “torture” requires instigation, consent or acquiescence by a 
public official.41 In Teitiota, however, it was considered whether the applicant could gain 
protection under s 131. The IPT found that protection on the basis of the arbitrary 
deprivation of life requires an act or omission of the state which threatens an imminent 
violation of the right.42 The Tribunal recognised that states have positive obligations to 
protect the right to life from known environmental hazards, and that a failure to do so 
may, in principle, constitute an omission.43 However, it was found that the Kiribati 
Government had fulfilled these obligations by playing an active role in making known the 
threats posed to its State by climate change.44 A subsequent IPT decision has confirmed 
that to expect PICT governments to mitigate the underlying drivers of climate change, 
and to equate such an inability with a failure of state protection, would “place an 
impossible burden on the state”.45 It was also confirmed that any threat to life as a result 
of climate change did not meet the required threshold to establish imminence.46 The 
  
36 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 
UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987).  
37 Immigration Act, s 130(1). 
38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
39 Immigration Act, s 131(1). 
40 AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [78]. 
41 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, above n 
36, art 1; Tennent and Armstrong, above n 35, at 329. 
42 AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [85] and [89]. 
43 AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [87]. 
44 AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [88]. 
45 AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517-520 at [75]. 
46 AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [91]. 
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applicant was also unable to show that there was a qualifying act by the Kiribati 
Government which would amount to “cruel treatment”.47 
 
Therefore, Teitiota confirms in the New Zealand context what has previously presumed 
to be the case: without an added element of human agency, neither refugee nor 
complementary protection will extend to those who are forced to relocate as a result of 
climate change.  
3 Humanitarian Grounds 
Additional protection on humanitarian grounds exists within the New Zealand legal 
framework. Pursuant to s 207 of the Immigration Act, the IPT has the discretionary 
power to overturn a decision for deportation where the applicant does not meet the 
requirements for refugee or protected person status, but there are “exceptional 
circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the 
appellant to be deported”.48 The potential of this ground to provide protection to those 
displaced by climate change has been significantly over-stated in recent media coverage 
of the IPT decision in AD (Tuvalu)49 which heralded the case, in which a Tuvaluan family 
successfully appealed a decision for their deportation on humanitarian grounds, as “the 
first legal recognition of “climate refugees””.50 This is, however, “wildly off the mark”.51 
While climate change was one of the matters taken into account by the IPT when 
considering whether humanitarian circumstances existed,52 the finding of such 
circumstances was based for the most part on the fact that deportation in this case would 
amount to an “unusually significant disruption to a dense network of family 
relationships”.53 It should also be noted that the applicants brought another case for 
  
47 AF (Kiribati), above n 16, at [95]. 
48 Immigration Act, s 207; Jane McAdam “No “Climate Refugees” in New Zealand” (13 August 2014) 
Planet Policy – Brookings Institution <www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy>. 
49 AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370-371. 
50 McAdam, above n 48; Amy Maas “Tuvalu climate change family win NZ residency appeal” The New 
Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 3 August 2014). 
51 Vernon Rive ““Climate refugees” revisited: a closer look at the Tuvalu decision” (14 August 2014) 
Vernon Rive – Environmental Barrister <www.vernonrive.co.nz>. 
52 AD (Tuvalu), above n 49, at [30]. 
53 AD (Tuvalu), above n 49, at [30]. 
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refugee and protected person status on the basis of the impacts of climate change. This 
claim was rejected in AC (Tuvalu), a decision confirming the reasoning in Teitiota.54 
 
AD (Tuvalu) by no means marks the discovery of a new avenue for protection for those 
displaced by climate change. While evidence of the impacts of climate change may be 
considered as part of the inquiry into whether humanitarian circumstances exist,55 
humanitarian grounds will only provide protection in unique cases where the stringent 
test of “exceptional circumstances” is satisfied.56 Generally, climate change alone will not 
be enough to reach this threshold.57 As such, Vernon Rive has noted that the decision 
“doesn’t provide an open ticket for people from all the places that are impacted by 
climate change”.58 If anything, it serves to highlight the limits of current legal 
protection.59 
B United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
There are also no general obligations on states at international law in regards to climate 
change displacement. Under the UNFCCC, developed countries are committed to 
providing assistance to developing countries “in meeting costs of adaptation to those 
adverse effects [of climate change]”.60 While migration is considered an adaptation 
measure, this broad commitment is not reinforced by any obligations specifically 
concerned with migration.61 
C Responsibility to Protect 
It has also been argued that the international community may be subject to an emerging 
“responsibility to protect” in relation to those who are displaced by natural disasters, such 
  
54 AC (Tuvalu), above n 45.  
55 AD (Tuvalu), above n 49, at [32]. 
56 Rive, above n 51. 
57 Rive, above n 51. 
58 Maas, above n 50. 
59 McAdam, above n 48. 
60 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 15, art 4(4). 
61 McLeman, above n 22, at 15. 
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as climate change, where their own governments are unable or unwilling to assist them.62 
However, while the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 
2001 Report identified “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes” as a 
possible ground upon which a responsibility to protect might arise,63 at the 2005 World 
Summit the scope of the responsibility was limited to situations of genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.64 Therefore, while it is possible a 
responsibility might arise where the impacts of climate change led to a situation in which 
such crimes are committed,65 it is difficult to speak of any existing or emerging 
responsibility towards those displaced by climate change. 
D Regional Instruments 
Finally, there are no obligations on states at a regional level in the Pacific which address 
protection of climate change displaced people. In 2008, the Pacific Islands Forum signed 
the Niue Declaration in which nations undertook to “encourage the Pacific’s 
Development Partners to increase their technical and financial support for climate change 
action on adaptation, mitigation, and if necessary, relocation”.66 This commitment, 
however, was non-binding and no specific obligations were agreed upon. Subsequently, 
in the Majuro Declaration of September 2013, the reference to “relocation” was 
omitted.67 
 
  
62 Tyra Saecho “Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to Clarity” (2007) 32 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 663. 
63 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect 
(December 2001) at 33. 
64 2005 World Summit Outcome GA Res 60/1, A/Res/60/1 (2005) at [138]. 
65 Stuart Ford “Is the failure to respond appropriately to a natural disaster a crime against humanity? The 
responsibility to protect and individual criminal responsibility in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis (2010) 38 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 227. 
66 Pacific Islands Forum “Forum Leaders endorse the Niue Declaration on Climate Change” (press release, 
26 August 2008). 
67 Pacific Islands Forum “Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership” (adopted 5 September 2013, 
Majuro); Vernon Rive “Safe Harbours, Closed Borders? New Zealand Legal and Policy Responses to 
Climate Displacement in the South Pacific” (Conference Contribution, 2013 IUCN Academy of 
Environmental Law Annual Colloquium, Waikato University, June 2013) at 5. 
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It is clear, therefore, that those who are displaced by climate change “fall through the 
cracks of international refugee and immigration policy”.68 
 
III Climate Change Displacement in the Pacific Region and Implications for 
New Zealand 
This issue of the protection deficit at international law for those displaced by climate 
change is a global one. This paper argues, however, that it should be of particular concern 
to New Zealand as a developed nation in the Pacific - a region referred to as “climate 
change ground zero”. 69 
A Climate Change Displacement in the Pacific 
PICTs are on the climate change front line. As low-lying states, they are vulnerable to sea 
level rise and the increased frequency of extreme sea-level events such as storm surges.70 
Erosion and flooding pose a significant threat to PICTS, where most human communities 
and infrastructure are located in coastal zones and there are limited internal relocation 
opportunities.71 Salt-water intrusions threaten the contamination of fresh water sources72 
and the salination of arable soil, which reduces agricultural productivity - the base of 
PICT economies.73 Furthermore, increased ocean acidity leads to the degradation of coral 
reefs, which play a significant role in reducing foreshore erosion74 and are critical to the 
subsistence fisheries and tourism industries.75 While much of the discussion of the risks 
faced by PICTs has focussed on that of inundation, the more immediate threat is these 
  
68 International Organization for Migration, above n 8, at 10.  
69  McAdam, above n 3, at 2. 
70 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Chapter 12: Human Security. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Neil Adger, 
Juan Pulhin, Jon Barnett, Geoffery Dabelko, Grete Hovelsrud, Marc Levy, Ursula Oswald Spring, Coleen 
Vogel, Helen Adams, Jennifer Hodbod, Stuart Kent, Marcela Tarazona] (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) at 2. 
71 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 70, at 5. 
72 John Campbell “Climate Change Migration in the Pacific” (2014) 26 The Contemporary Pacific 1 at 3. 
73 Campbell, above n 72, at 3. 
74 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 70, at 7. 
75 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 70, at 9. 
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slow-onset processes, which will make the land increasingly unsustainable and eventually 
uninhabitable, “long before complete inundation”.76 At greatest risk are atolls such as 
Kiribati, Tokelau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, which are low-lying, with no soils, no 
surface water, low levels of terrestrial biodiversity, and fragile groundwater systems.77 
 
These physical vulnerabilities are further exacerbated by pre-existing development 
challenges faced by PICTs which make adaptation to changing conditions more difficult. 
The Stern Review recognised that “climate change … will have a disproportionately 
harmful effect on developing countries”78 as a result of “exposure to an already fragile 
environment, an economic structure that is highly sensitive to an adverse and changing 
climate, and low incomes constrain[ing] their ability to adapt”.79 This is especially true in 
the case of the Pacific Islands, which are “amongst the most aid-dependent and least 
progressive developing nations in the world”.80 The Pacific faces challenges including 
poverty, low GDP, unemployment, pollution, high population growth and over-
population in urban areas.81 Kiribati’s Solicitor-General David Lambourne has noted that 
“climate change overlays [these] pre-existing pressures … which means that it may 
provide a ‘tipping point’ which would not have been reached in its absence”.82 
 
It is clear that by mid-century, as a result of these vulnerabilities, there will be a large 
number of people in the Pacific displaced by climate change. While there has been 
limited work done on quantifying this movement, scenarios developed by University of 
  
76 Maxine Burkett “In Search of Refuge: Pacific Islands, Climate-Induced Migration, and the Legal 
Frontier” Asia Pacific Issues No 98 (East West Centre, January 2011) at 4 and 5; McAdam, above n 3, at 
16; Kelly Wyett “Escaping a Rising Tide: Sea Level Rise and Migration in Kiribati” (2014) 1 Asia and the 
Pacific Policy Studies 171 at 172. 
77 Campbell, above n 72, at 4. 
78 Nicholas Stern The Economics of Climate Change – The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) at 92. 
79 Stern, above n 78, at 93 
80 Stacey Kwant “The Potential of Pacific Seasonal Workers to Meet New Zealand and Australia’s 
Development Goals for the Pacific Islands” (MA Thesis in Political Science, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2012) at 99. 
81 Jane McAdam “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the 
Answer” (2011) 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 2 at 4; Wyett, above n 76, at 174. 
82 McAdam, above n 81, at 13. 
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Waikato researcher John Campbell estimate that between 665,000 and 1.7 million 
individuals in the Pacific will migrate or be displaced by 2050.83 One can also get a sense 
of the scale of the potential issue when considering that it is estimated that by 2050 there 
will be 320,000 people living on Pacific Island atolls – those areas which are most 
vulnerable to climate change and from which many people are likely to be displaced. 84 
Numbers likely to be displaced from non-atoll locations will also be significant, and 
could surpass those from atolls.85 While more research is needed to quantify this 
movement, it is clear that climate change has the potential to cause mass population 
movements in the Pacific.86 
B An Imperative for New Zealand Action 
It seems clear that New Zealand is under no legal obligation to respond to climate change 
displacement in the Pacific. Yet, as one of the developed nations in the region, this 
impending crisis and the lack of any international response should be of particular 
concern. There are significant incentives for New Zealand to act.  
 
Firstly, there is a well-documented moral argument for developed nations with high per 
capita emissions, such as New Zealand, to support the people of developing nations who 
will suffer disproportionately compared to their contribution to climate change.87 While 
PICTs are responsible for only an estimated 0.3 per cent of global emissions88 and only 
1.84 per cent of Oceania’s emissions (the bulk coming from Australia and New 
Zealand),89 these nations will experience the impacts of climate change most severely. 
  
83 John Campbell “Climate Change and Population – Movement in Pacific Island Countries” in Bruce 
Burson (ed) Climate Change and Migration: South Pacific Perspectives (Institute of Policy Studies, 
Wellington, 2010) 29 at 38. 
84 Campbell, above n 72, at 13. 
85 Campbell, above n 72, at 14. 
86 New Zealand Department of Labour Population Movement in the Pacific: A Perspective on Future 
Prospects (2012) at vi. 
87 Burkett, above n 76, at 3. 
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Thus, there is a “unique and compelling moral element to the[se] migrants’ situation” ,90 
and a strong moral imperative for a nation with the stated goal of “mak[ing] its mark as a 
global citizen” to provide for their protection.91 
 
There is also a significant practical incentive for New Zealand to act. The impacts of 
climate change will increasingly be felt in the Pacific, and as they grow more acute, New 
Zealand will face increasing pressure for migration opportunities from its vulnerable 
PICT neighbours. A number of Pacific leaders have identified New Zealand as a country 
from whom assistance is sought in addressing the challenges of climate change.92 New 
Zealand has a long history of playing an important role in the Pacific, providing support 
to smaller island states and establishing strong cultural, social and political ties.93 There 
are also significant numbers of Pacific people already settled in New Zealand who retain 
strong ties to their countries of origin, and whose pre-established communities offer 
support for future migrants.94 New Zealand is seen as a natural migration destination, and 
it would “be naïve … to expect anything other than a significant increase in the numbers 
of Pacific residents seeking refuge in … New Zealand”.95 New Zealand will, whether by 
choice or not, be on the front line in addressing climate change displacement in the 
Pacific.  
 
To withhold action is to wait for a humanitarian crisis to occur, a situation which would 
require significantly higher levels of outward migration, with greater urgency, higher 
costs, and less scope for planning.96 It would also give rise to a serious security threat in 
the region. As conditions become more challenging and resources more scarce, climate 
change has “the potential to … lead to considerable instability, disruption and conflict” in 
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the Pacific.97 Therefore, while international law does not provide adequate protection to 
those who will be displaced, “we cannot continue to ignore environmental refugees 
simply because there is no institutionalised mode of dealing with them”.98 Instead, 
beginning to address this issue now will lessen the impact and likelihood of a 
humanitarian crisis in the Pacific. The key question, therefore, is what shape a New 
Zealand policy response should take.  
 
IV A New Zealand Policy Response 
It is critical that any response to climate change displacement in the Pacific not only 
provides the opportunity for Pacific peoples to migrate, but that such a response ensures 
“migration with dignity”.99 Much of the literature examining climate change 
displacement has focused on “remedial protection responses”, instruments which provide 
protection once people have been displaced, such as the extension of refugee status and 
complementary protection measures, at either the international or domestic level.100 Such 
measures, however, are designed to respond only once a humanitarian crisis has occurred 
and fail to address the scope that exists for pre-emptive action, which may help to avoid a 
migration crisis occurring, or lessen its impact.  
 
The slow onset nature of climate change impacts provides an opportunity which does not 
usually exist in other instances of mass displacement to, “plan for responses, rather than 
rely … on remedial instruments in the case of spontaneous and desperate flight”.101 There 
will be significant benefits for both origin and destination communities if the migration of 
increasing numbers of people from the Pacific can be “managed progressively through a 
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co-ordinated approach” in which Pacific peoples make their own decisions about 
movement, in their own time.102 Kiribati President, Anote Tong, has emphasised that “the 
relocation of the 100,000 people of Kiribati … cannot be done overnight. It requires long 
term forward planning and the sooner we act, the less stressful and the less painful it 
[will] be for all concerned”.103 Schemes which work on the model of pre-emptive, 
voluntary migration have a much higher chance of success than delaying action until the 
mass resettlement of communities is the only option.104  
1 Migration as a Form of Adaptation 
Pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes challenge the assumption that migration 
represents a failure of adaptation and a measure of last resort.105 In fact, migration can be 
an important part of an “integrated adaptation strategy” for communities who must adjust 
to changing environmental conditions.106 Migration can contribute positively to 
adaptation by building financial, social and human capital, improving the lives of 
migrants and their home communities.107  
 
Migrants who relocate under pre-emptive, voluntary schemes have a far greater chance of 
successfully settling in New Zealand than forced migrants. They will face lower costs and 
a lower risk of social dislocation than if they are forced to migrate in an emergency 
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107 Jon Barnett and Michael Webber “Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits” in Jane McAdam 
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situation.108 The gradual settlement of Pacific peoples in New Zealand in a slow but 
sustained process will also allow communities to become established, who will be able to 
facilitate future migration.109  
 
Pre-emptive, voluntary migration will be beneficial to the communities of origin, helping 
them to adapt to climate change. Communities receive significant financial benefits 
through the receipt of remittances - money sent back to home communities by 
migrants.110 Remittances are already an important source of finance for development in 
the Pacific, for example, amounting to 15 per cent of GDP in Kiribati and 40 per cent in 
Tonga.111 Remittances ensure access to basic needs across seasons and during livelihood 
shocks, and provide added capital to the local economy, which helps communities to 
adapt.112 Secondly, communities of origin receive benefits when migrants return home 
temporarily, bringing with them new skills and knowledge.113 Importantly, pre-emptive 
migration schemes also relieve population pressures and demands for resources in 
sending countries, and this significantly increases adaptive capacity114 allowing those 
who wish to remain to do so for longer.115  
 
There are also clear benefits to New Zealand in implementing pre-emptive, voluntary 
migration schemes. While the dominant discourse in developed nations around migrants 
is often negative, there is a significant body of research to show that migrants who move 
voluntarily are generally hard-working, seeking to maximise incomes, build a life for 
themselves and send money back to relatives at home.116 From a New Zealand 
perspective, pre-emptive, voluntary migration schemes allow a greater degree of control 
over the process of migration. Schemes can be developed which will have dual benefits 
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both for sending communities and New Zealand, there are lower costs, and less 
infrastructure is required than in a situation of mass relocation.117  
2 The Challenges of Pre-emptive Migration Schemes 
In order for implementation to be successful however, the challenges inherent in such 
schemes must be addressed. 
 
For many of those who choose to relocate to New Zealand, it is likely that migration will 
be a challenging process. Climate migrants will generally be moving from rural and 
developing communities, with limited financial resources. They are likely to face 
challenges in integrating into their new communities.118 There is a risk that migrants 
could be subject to discrimination and that they may be locked into low-wage jobs as a 
result of low skill levels, or of having skills which are not suited to the New Zealand job 
market.119 This is of particular concern, not only because these factors may affect 
migrants’ abilities to settle and contribute to New Zealand society, but also because if 
migrants are unable to settle successfully, this may engage New Zealand’s legal 
responsibilities on the international plane. In agreeing to settle climate migrants, New 
Zealand’s obligations are not simply limited to ensuring their “survival and physical 
security” but also to upholding their civil and political, as well as economic, social and 
cultural rights.120 If migrants do not receive adequate support, this may impair their 
enjoyment of their rights as minority groups121 to enjoy and take part in cultural life,122 as 
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well as their rights to work, education and to an adequate standard of living.123 In order to 
comply with these positive obligations124 and to ensure successful settlement of migrants, 
New Zealand may need to provide extra support at an individual level, for example, 
assistance with job-seeking, finding housing and developing language skills to help 
migrants to adjust to life in New Zealand,125 and at a community level to facilitate the 
continuance of social practices.126 
 
Communities of origin also face risks with the introduction of migration schemes, 
primarily the loss of human capital, especially because those who migrate are likely to be 
more skilled than those who remain. Where the movements of people are large, migration 
may increase vulnerability to climate change.127 For example, since the early 1970s, there 
has been large-scale migration from Niue, which is in free association with New Zealand 
(meaning that all Niueans are New Zealand citizens), to the extent that now 80 per cent of 
the Niuean-born population live in New Zealand.128 This has reduced population and 
resource pressures in Niue, but it has also accentuated market distortions, increased 
labour demands, increased disputes over land, and raised significant concerns about 
Niue’s ability to maintain its cultural identity.129 To ensure migration schemes have 
adaptive benefits for communities of origin, they must not counter the efforts of other 
adaptation programmes. It is important to try and avoid a “brain drain” with the out-
migration of skilled community members. This might involve staggering movement, 
diversifying the nature of the schemes, facilitating temporary migration, encouraging the 
temporary return of permanent migrants, and encouraging migration from communities 
not currently benefiting from remittances.130 New Zealand must also encourage the 
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practice of remittance payments to ensure maximum financial benefit for PICT 
communities from migration, for example, by capping fees to reduce the costs of 
transfers.131 
 
The implementation of migration schemes in response to climate change will also have 
costs for New Zealand, with an increased burden on finances and infrastructure. From a 
New Zealand perspective, a balance must be reached between trying to minimise the 
costs of such schemes, while also ensuring that once a commitment is made to 
implementation, there is sufficient investment to ensure they are successful. Costs will be 
reduced in the short term by encouraging migration of skilled migrants and migrants who 
are able to work or be trained in areas of skill shortage in New Zealand. Long-term costs 
will be reduced by providing the adequate support to migrants to ensure they are able to 
settle successfully in New Zealand.  
 
V Policy Recommendations 
This paper recommends that a New Zealand response to climate change displacement in 
the Pacific should involve the implementation of a range of voluntary, pre-emptive 
migration schemes, which facilitate mobility in the region for a diverse range of people, 
while balancing the interests of migrants, PICT communities and New Zealand. These 
schemes should build upon the pre-existing immigration framework, and include the 
expansion of permanent and temporary migration schemes and the implementation of 
labour-training programmes. 
A Permanent Migration Schemes 
One focus of New Zealand policy reform should be on increasing the ability of PICT 
citizens to gain residency in New Zealand through targeted schemes.  
1 Current Scheme – The Pacific Access Category 
New Zealand is unique in already having in place a scheme for permanent migration to 
New Zealand directed specifically at PICTs - the Pacific Access Category (PAC). The 
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PAC provides for residency for 75 people from Kiribati, 75 from Tuvalu and 250 from 
Tonga annually.132 The scheme was introduced in 2002, and is designed to grant 
residency to Pacific people who would otherwise not meet the regular requirements133 
and as a means of assisting these smaller nations.134 The scheme replaced the seasonal 
work schemes previously in place with Tuvalu and Kiribati.135 Applicants are drawn from 
a ballot and invited to apply for residence. In order to meet conditions for residence it 
must be shown that they: 136 
(a) are aged between 18 and 45; 
(b) have an offer of employment in New Zealand;137  
(c) meet minimum English language requirements; and 
(d) meet health and character requirements for New Zealand residence applications. 
 
The PAC is a traditional migration programme, but in some respects it is already well-
suited towards being a tool for climate change migration. It is aimed specifically at 
Pacific Island countries who are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and provides a 
migration pathway for people who do not meet the regular requirements for residency.138 
The ballot process means that all migrants have an equal chance of being invited to apply 
for residence.139 Further reform of the scheme would, however, improve its utility as a 
climate change migration tool. The scheme exists under the Immigration New Zealand 
Operational Manual (“the INZ Operational Manual”),140 which constitutes “immigration 
instructions” for the purposes of the Immigration Act,141 and as such, the terms of the 
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scheme can be altered upon certification of the Minister.142 Legislative change is not 
required for the necessary reforms to be made. 
2 Options for Reform 
The first focus for reform of the PAC should be on incrementally increasing quota 
numbers and expanding the scheme to other vulnerable PICTs. Quota numbers under the 
scheme are small. On-going population growth in islands such as Kiribati and Tuvalu is 
going to increase the number of people who may require relocation, and slowing or 
reversing this population growth will require significant increases in out-migration.143 In 
the case of Tuvalu, because of its small population (10,000), these numbers are relatively 
low compared to New Zealand’s overall residency programme. However in the case of 
Kiribati (population 100,000), “reversing population growth…will be impossible without 
major increases in outmigration”.144 Increased quotas under PAC would be one way of 
facilitating increased flows of migrants from these vulnerable PICTs.  
 
A second focus for reform should be increased job-seeker support so that those who are 
selected under the ballot are able to take up their invitations for residency. There is some 
evidence that those who have been selected under the scheme have had difficulty finding 
appropriate employment.145 While there are already some supports in place for those who 
are selected under the ballot (for example, employment agents in New Zealand who pass 
on CVs of applicants to prospective New Zealand employers, and the ability to travel to 
New Zealand on a visitor visa to search for a job),146 more could be done to ensure those 
selected in the ballot are eligible for residence. This could include funding recruitment 
agents to actively seek out job opportunities for migrants who are unable to find their 
own employment. It could also include the provision of financial support to help those 
who need to travel to New Zealand on a visitor visa to search for work.  
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The scheme’s regulatory framework should also be reconsidered. While the scheme’s 
basis in the INZ Operational Manual means that reform of the scheme can be more easily 
achieved than if parliamentary support was required, it also leaves the PAC, as a 
unilateral scheme without a legislative basis, vulnerable to abolition or limitation. In 
order to better secure this migration pathway for climate change migrants it may be that 
the scheme itself should be given a legislative basis, or given the status of international 
legal obligation in the form of bilateral or plurilateral agreements with the Pacific 
countries of origin. 
3 Limitations of Reform 
A key limitation of the scheme, however, is that migration under PAC will not be 
possible for a large portion of PICT populations who are unskilled, and will not meet the 
age and language requirements, or will be unable to find a job in New Zealand147 - the 
very people who are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.148 Therefore, there 
are significant equity concerns about the scheme. The possibility for reform in this area, 
however, is likely to be limited. The removal of the requirements under the scheme 
would be unlikely to be politically viable, as this would involve far greater cost for New 
Zealand. Migrants arriving without the necessary skills to adjust to life in New Zealand 
would require far greater settlement support, more akin to that provided to refugees. 
 
Another concern about the expansion of the PAC is that in offering permanent migration 
to PICT community members who are more skilled, and therefore likely to play an 
important part in a community’s ability to adapt to changing environmental conditions, 
there is a risk of reducing the adaptive capacity of communities.149 Implementation, 
therefore, must balance New Zealand’s interest in receiving migrants of a particular skill 
level, and the interests of PICTs in retaining human capital. This will be best achieved by 
ensuring that increased quota numbers do not exceed a level which is sustainable in terms 
of communities’ adaptive capacities. Migration beyond this level should be facilitated 
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through temporary migration schemes, which ensure the return of migrants with 
improved skill sets. Ensuring that communities receive the financial and social benefits of 
permanent out-migration will also help to mitigate any possible negative effects of the 
loss of human capital. This can be achieved by better facilitating remittance payments, 
and encouraging permanent migrants to return home temporarily, so that they can 
contribute their new knowledge and skills and extend the social network of PICT 
communities.150 
B Temporary Labour Migration Schemes 
A second strategy for facilitating migration between New Zealand and PICTs is to 
increase access to temporary migration. 
1 Current Scheme – the Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme 
New Zealand introduced the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme in 2007. The 
scheme grants migrants temporary visas to work in the horticulture and viticulture 
industries. Preference is given to workers from Pacific Islands Forum countries, and 
workers are granted seven-month visas (nine-month for those from Kiribati and Tuvalu), 
and they may return if they are recruited again.151 To gain entry under the scheme, 
migrants must show that they have a job offer from an approved employer.152 The scheme 
was designed to solve the shortage of seasonal labour workers in these industries and 
boost productivity, as well as benefiting temporary workers and their country of origin, 
and is designed to contribute to New Zealand’s goals in the Pacific region regarding 
“economic development, regional integration and stability”.153 
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The RSE Scheme has been deemed to be “best-practice”154 and in many ways is a 
suitable climate change migration tool. The scheme provides the opportunity for 
migration to a wider group of people than those included under the PAC scheme, as it is 
targeted at unskilled workers. Migrants under the scheme are able to work temporarily 
abroad, earn an income, up-skill and then return home.155 This allows them to remain in 
their communities for longer than might otherwise have been possible, and enhances the 
adaptive capacity of communities, as there is no permanent loss of human capital. 
Migrants will return to their communities of origin, bringing with them new skill sets and 
financial resources. Indeed, participation in the scheme has raised incomes in both Tonga 
and Vanuatu, allowed households to accumulate more assets and increased subjective 
standards of living.156 The time spent by migrants in New Zealand also allows them to 
develop networks, especially with employers, which may provide opportunities for 
permanent migration in the future, for example under the PAC. Further reform of the 
scheme would however be desirable. As with the PAC, the RSE scheme exists under the 
INZ Operational Manual, meaning changes can be made by the Minister without the need 
for legislative reform.157 
2 Options for Reform 
In the first instance the focus of reform should be on increasing the number of visas on 
offer. Currently, the number of visas under the scheme is capped at 9,000.158 The 
horticulture and viticulture industry has been lobbing for increases to the cap, with 
industry groups saying that the scheme underpins the growth in the sector.159 Moreover, 
the horticulture and viticulture industry is forecasting employment growth of over 3000 
jobs in the next financial year,160 and a recent paper by the Ministry of Primary Industries 
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has predicted an extra 7,800 workers will be needed by 2025.161 This suggests the 
capacity for increased quotas. Similar schemes could also be introduced in other growth 
industries, using the model of the RSE scheme, to increase the temporary migration flow 
from PICTs.  
 
Secondly, there is the capacity for Immigration New Zealand (“INZ”) to set up better 
linkages between the RSE and PAC schemes.162 There are some employers under the 
RSE scheme who have looked to support their workers who subsequently get balloted 
under the PAC by providing them with offers for continuing employment in the 
horticulture industry, in jobs where their skills are needed through the year.163 This 
enables migrants to experience life in New Zealand before applying for permanent 
residency, and helps them meet the PAC employment requirements. From a New Zealand 
perspective, it is also beneficial to have migrants applying for permanent migration who 
have already spent time in New Zealand, will be more familiar with the culture and are 
likely to already have support networks in New Zealand. INZ could play an active role in 
encouraging these links.164 This could involve ensuring that all RSE employers and 
employees are aware of and have access to information about the PAC, and seeking out 
employers under the RSE scheme who may have capacity to take on workers not only 
seasonally, but in the long term also. Additionally, a separate PAC access category could 
be created under the INZ Operational Manual for those who are already in New Zealand 
or have already worked in New Zealand temporarily to increase their chance of being 
selected in the ballot.  
 
As with the PAC, because the RSE scheme exists under the Operational Manual, there 
may be an interest in achieving greater protection for this pathway by giving it a 
legislative basis, or establishing its terms through international agreement. However, this 
may be less viable than in the case of the PAC. Because the scheme is designed to 
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respond to labour shortages it may be harder to predict the future capacity of the scheme, 
and it is likely the government would want to retain greater control of its terms. 
3 Limitations of Reform 
One concern with the expansion of such a scheme is that it does not deal with long-term 
migration pressures. In a strict sense this is true. However, relocation is “not simply a 
material infrastructure process … it is also a social process”.165 Many people do not want 
to migrate, or may not have the resources to do so permanently.166 Temporary schemes 
offer these people another tool for in-situ adaptation. Secondly, temporary schemes allow 
greater migration flows while having less of a “brain drain” effect than permanent 
migrations schemes, which helps to ensure that out-migration does not counteract other 
adaptive benefits.167 Finally, it is also clear that temporary schemes such as this do help to 
address long-term migration concerns. They allow migrants to develop networks and 
adapt to the culture in New Zealand, making future permanent migration a greater 
possibility.168 
 
Another potential criticism of expansion of the scheme is that while the RSE is presented 
as being a “triple-win”, there is also an argument that the biggest beneficiary is New 
Zealand, while migrants are locked into a low-wage, manual strata of the economy. 
While the scheme was shown to increase household incomes in PICTs, migrants were 
earning relatively low wages. The median after-tax income in New Zealand reported by 
the seasonal migrants was $12,000.169 After accounting for costs, Tongan workers on 
average remitted or brought back with them $5,500.170 A similar critique could be made 
of the PAC scheme: that without greater social, economic and educative support within 
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these programmes, Pacific peoples will face a life with little opportunity for growth, and 
few choices in New Zealand.  
C Labour-Training Migration Pathways 
This paper’s final policy recommendation is the introduction of labour-training schemes, 
in which migrants are trained and employed in skilled occupations in shortage in New 
Zealand.   
1 The Australian Model – Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative 
A model for this exists in Queensland. The Australian Government introduced the 
“Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative” (KANI) in 2006, a programme funded through 
AusAID.171 Through the initiative, which is designed to address climate change 
imperatives, rapid population growth, youth unemployment and diversify the remittance 
base, i-Kiribati school graduates are awarded scholarships to train as nurses at Griffith 
University, Brisbane.172 Once their training is complete, they are able to seek 
employment in Australia, return to Kiribati, or use their skills to qualify for skilled 
migration in other countries.173 Where students choose to remain and work in Australia, 
there is no automatic granting of residency or citizenship, instead they must apply for an 
employer-sponsored visa.174 
 
The 2013 Independent Review of the KANI described it as an “innovative model for 
‘doing development’ in small, environmentally fragile Pacific island countries”, and 
found that it “remains strongly relevant to the sustainable development needs of Kiribati 
and to its adaptation policy of ‘migration with dignity’ to address serious climate change 
  
171 “Kiribati: Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative” (24 January 2014) Australian Government - Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/kiribati>. 
172 Lea Shaw, Murray Edwards and Akka Rimon KANI Independent Review – Review Report (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, April 2013, updated February 2014) at 5. 
173 Lara O’Brien ““Migrating with Dignity”: A Study of the Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative (KANI)” 
(Master of Arts Thesis, University of Kansas, 2013) at 60. 
174 O’Brien, above n 173, at 121. 
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imperatives”.175 The review did note, however, that the costs of the scheme were 
relatively high for the developmental benefits.176  
2 New Zealand Implementation 
New Zealand could introduce a similar scheme under the INZ Operational Manual, aimed 
at vulnerable PICTs such as Tuvalu and Kiribati and designed to fill skill shortages in 
New Zealand. Long-term skill shortages identified by INZ which could be suitable for 
inclusion in such schemes include nursing, physiotherapy, radiography, agriculture and 
forestry, and surveying.177 The scheme would likely be most effective if it was 
implemented in areas such as nursing where there is a skill shortage in PICTs also.178 
 
The implementation of a labour-training scheme would provide another migration 
pathway and would diversify the range of people in PICTs for whom migration is 
available as an adaptive response. Migration under a labour-training scheme avoids 
concerns about locking migrants into low-wage jobs, and plays an active role in up-
skilling participants. It would result in a diversification of the source of remittances being 
sent back to their home countries, which helps to ensure that there is a continual flow of 
remittances back to PICTs, even if there are livelihood shocks in New Zealand. It is also 
likely that the remittances paid would be higher under such a scheme, as migrants will be 
working in skilled occupations which are more highly paid. Finally, there are significant 
benefits to New Zealand in being able to target migration towards areas of labour 
shortage.  
3 Ensuring Success of the Scheme 
For the scheme to be a success, however, there needs to be consideration of the tension 
identified by the Australian review of the KANI which exists between ensuring that the 
scheme has development benefits for migrants and PICT communities, and the cost 
  
175 Shaw, Edwards and Rimon, above n 172, at 11. 
176 Shaw, Edwards and Rimon, above n 172, at 11. 
177 “Long Term Skill Shortage List” (24 March 2014) Immigration New Zealand 
<http://skillshortages.immigration.govt.nz>.  
178 Joel Negin, “Australia and New Zealand’s Contribution to Pacific Island Health Worker Brain Drain” 
(2008) 32 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 507 at 507. 
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implications for New Zealand. A labour-training migration scheme has a high cost, 
especially in comparison to the PAC and the RSE schemes. These costs can be offset to 
some extent by having migrants contribute to the workforce in areas of skill shortage in 
New Zealand after they complete their training, which will simultaneously reduce 
population pressures and increase remittances for communities of origin. However, there 
are competing concerns: such schemes run the risk of reducing the adaptive capacity of 
PICT communities through the “brain drain” that may be effected by enabling high-
achieving school leavers to emigrate, and there would also be adaptation benefits to PICT 
communities if migrants return after completing their training and contribute to the health 
sector in the islands. 
 
There are a number of options for achieving an acceptable balance between the cost 
burden and adaptive benefits. It may be that a scheme would only be financially viable if 
trainees were under a contractual obligation to work for a set period in New Zealand after 
graduation. It may also be the case that in order to effectively counter skill shortages in 
New Zealand, migrants will need to be encouraged or required to live and work in the 
provinces, rather than the main urban centres. It should be noted though that migrants 
will be more likely to settle successfully in larger urban centres, where community 
support networks are already established.  
 
In order to maximise the adaptive benefits for communities and to try and avoid the 
negative effects of the loss of human capital, there could be a condition on participants 
who remain in New Zealand to return to their countries of origin periodically and 
volunteer their skills. Though studies of the KANI suggest that a strict requirement may 
not be necessary – participants felt it was important that they return as regularly as 
possible, contribute their skills and send money back to their home communities.179 
 
In order to ensure the scheme works successfully as a migration pathway, such a scheme 
should also provide greater job-seeking and residency support than the Australian scheme 
does. The programme should provide the option for trainees to be given a work 
  
179 O’Brien, above n 173, at 119 and 125. 
  31
placement once they have completed their studies, rather than leaving them to seek their 
own jobs, as is required under the Australian model. This will provide greater security for 
participants in the programme, who may find job seeking in the New Zealand market 
difficult, despite having earned the requisite qualifications. The scheme should also 
provide an automatic granting of residency to participants once they have completed their 
training (if they wish to stay in New Zealand), rather than requiring them to find work 
before this is provided. Again, this provides migrants with security and certainty, and 
would reflect a commitment on New Zealand’s behalf for the scheme to work not only as 
a training scheme, but also as a migration pathway. 
 
VI Conclusion 
It is clear that international law provides insufficient protection to the millions of people 
worldwide who are likely to be displaced by the impacts of climate change. This is of 
particular concern to New Zealand. The Pacific Region is one of the most vulnerable in 
the world to the effects of climate change and is likely to experience high levels of out-
migration. As a result, New Zealand will face increasing migration pressure from 
neighbouring PICTs as the situation nears crisis point.  
 
A New Zealand policy response is required to address this concern of mounting migration 
pressures and the risk of a possible humanitarian disaster in the Pacific. This paper has 
argued that the most effective way of achieving this is through pre-emptive, voluntary 
migration schemes which facilitate movement between PICTs and New Zealand. Possible 
measures discussed include extending the Pacific Access Category and the Recognised 
Seasonal Employer Scheme, as well as introducing labour-training migration schemes.  
 
These schemes allow migration to be used as a tool of adaptation for migrants and their 
communities, and allow for New Zealand to plan and manage migration, which will not 
be possible if migration occurs during full-scale humanitarian crisis. These schemes will 
help to ensure that where relocation is necessary, Pacific peoples will be able to migrate 
with dignity.
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